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Abstract 
This research analyses to what extent the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected 
by freedom of expression. First, by reviewing how the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom 
of expression. Second, by reviewing the ECtHR’s approach in cases that concern incitement to 
hatred and freedom of expression. Third, by analysing the case of Delfi and the case of MTE 
and Index when it comes to liability and fourth, by examining the role of Internet media in the 
dissemination of hate speech online. Finally, this research concludes that the ECtHR treats 
online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression to the extent that the Internet 
news portal in question can be held liable for user-generated comments without this violating 
the news portal’s right to freedom of expression. 
  
Key words: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), liability, Delfi AS, MTE and 
Index, freedom of expression, Internet media 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
An important part of European society is the safeguarding of human rights protection 
and in particular the safeguarding of the rights to freedom of expression. Bleich (2014) points 
out that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) plays a pivotal role in the safeguarding 
of these rights and freedoms. Up to this very day the ECtHR aims to protect the right to freedom 
of expression on the European continent from evil speech and malicious speech acts even 
though, it held in Handyside v. the United Kingdom (application no. 5493/72) (Handyside) that 
freedom of expression protects ideas and information that shock, offend or disturb the State or 
other sectors of the population. Breckheimer (2002) argues that upholding and protecting the 
right to freedom of expression became a challenge for the ECtHR with the rise of the Internet 
and the increasing presence of hate groups and hate speech online. Where the United States 
Supreme Court (U.S. Supreme Court) realised that the content on the Internet is as diverse as 
human thought in the case of Reno v. ACLU (U.S. 844 870) in 1997, the ECtHR learned of this 
notion when it issued its first ruling on this matter in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia (application 
no. 64569/09) (Delfi) in 2015.  
Scholars wonder how the ECtHR will uphold the right to freedom of expression offline 
and online after they read the ECtHR’s judgement in the case of Editorial Board of Pravoye 
Delo and Shetekel v. Ukraine (application no. 33014/04). In this case the ECtHR states that “it 
is true that the Internet is an information and communication tool that is distinct from the printed 
media […]. The electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, is not and potentially 
will never be subject to the same regulation and control. The risk of harm posed by content and 
communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, 
[…], is certainly higher than those posed by the press. […]. Therefore, […] the printed media 
and the Internet may differ. The latter undeniably has to be adjusted according to the 
technology’s specific features in order to secure the protection and promotion of the rights and 
freedoms concerned.” (Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shetekel v. Ukraine (application 
no. 33014/04), 2011, para. 63). Scholars are particularly curious on how the ECtHR will treat 
cases that involve freedom of expression and online hate speech because the phenomenon of 
online hate speech and the field of cyberspace are relatively new to the ECtHR. The fact that 
online hate speech is not mentioned in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention or ECHR) or in any of the other major international 
Conventions or Covenants protecting human rights and combatting hate speech underline the 
former (Tseis, 2009). The reason that the field of cyberspace is relatively new to the ECtHR is 
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because the ECtHR is subsidiary to national courts. Hence, cases that originate at domestic 
courts appear only some ten years later in the courtroom of the ECtHR in Strasbourg. As a result 
of this legal system the first cases involving cyberspace (i.e. Internet cases) came to the ECtHR 
late 2000s. In light of the above, the question that this research will try to answer is: “To what 
extent does the European Court of Human Rights treat online hate speech as being protected by 
freedom of expression?” The hypothesis of this research is that it is case dependent whether or 
not the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. This 
hypothesis is based on the information that the ECtHR is known to make use of a case-by-case 
approach when it deals with cases that concern hate speech and freedom of expression 
(Oetheimer, 2009; Tulkens, 2015).  
The theory on the marketplace of ideas and the remedy of more speech were invented 
by two U.S. Supreme Court judges. Both theories play an extremely crucial role in the Supreme 
Court’s case law on freedom of expression and hate speech from the moment they have been 
applied in these cases by subsequent U.S. Supreme Court judges. The literature on freedom of 
expression and hate speech always links the theory of the marketplace of ideas and the remedy 
of more speech to the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court not only because they were created 
by U.S. Supreme Court judges but also because they fit into how the U.S. Supreme Court 
interprets and protects the notion of free speech.  
The literature on freedom of expression and hate speech has not linked the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas and the remedy of more speech to the ECtHR because the ECtHR 
interprets and protects the notion of freedom of expression differently than its American 
counterpart. Therefore, this research will not apply both approaches in the traditional fashion 
but in an unconventional manner. This applies that when the ECtHR would apply both 
approaches in its case law on freedom of expression and hate speech, it will have a negative 
effect on the protection of freedom of expression in Europe instead of the presumed positive 
one.  
Parts of this research are based on the paper hate speech: a prohibited or protected from 
of freedom of expression that I wrote for my course Human Rights Protection in Europe during 
my premaster European Union Studies in 2018. 
This research is structured as follows: chapter two will address the case law of the 
ECtHR concerning freedom of expression and hate speech. Furthermore, it will review the 
notion of freedom of expression in the relevant case law of the ECtHR. Chapter three will 
review the available academic literature on the notion of freedom of expression and hate speech. 
In addition, it will describe the scope and possible limitations of both the freedom of expression 
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and hate speech. Chapter four will explain the theory of the marketplace of ideas and the remedy 
of more speech. It will also explain which research method is applied in this research. Chapter 
five will analyse the role of liability of Internet news portals to the extent that the ECtHR treats 
online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. The structure of chapter six is 
comparable to the structure of chapter five but it will focus on the role of Internet media instead 
of the liability of Internet news portals. Chapter seven will answer the question to what extent 
the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression.   
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Chapter 2 The ECtHR’s case law on freedom of expression and hate speech 
  
2.1 Introduction  
In the case of Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden (application no. 1813/07), judges Villiger 
and Yudkivska wrote in their joined concurring opinion that “this appears to be the American 
approach, where hate speech is protected until it threatens to give rise to imminent violence. 
This is a very high threshold, and for many well-known political and historical reasons today’s 
Europe cannot afford the luxury of such a vision of the paramount value of free speech.” 
(Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden (application no. 1813/07), 2012, para. 7). Both judges speak 
about the protection of hate speech within the scope of freedom of expression. They indicate 
that ECtHR, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, cannot afford to give a high level of protection to 
hate speech within the scope of freedom of expression. This raises the question of what level 
of protection the ECtHR can give to hate speech within the scope of freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, it asks what level of protection the ECtHR can give to hate speech when it falls 
outside the scope of freedom of expression. It also asks of how the ECtHR portrays the notion 
of freedom of expression in its case law.  
This chapter will first review the notion of freedom of expression in the relevant case 
law of the ECtHR. After that it will first aim to review the level of protection that the ECtHR 
can give to hate speech when it falls inside the scope of freedom of expression and then it will 
aim to review the level of protection that the ECtHR can give to hate speech when it falls outside 
the scope of freedom of expression.  
 
2.2 The ECtHR: freedom of expression  
Freedom is an important aspect of democratic societies. Citizens of democratic societies 
expect to live in freedom and expect that their rights to freedoms are upheld. This becomes 
evident through citizens’ beliefs that they can say or write anything that is on their minds based 
on their right to freedom of expression. Orally or written statements on- or offline can be made 
in the name of freedom of expression to mock or harm other people’s appearance, speech, social 
position, ethnic background or to simply inform people. In my paper on hate speech: a 
protected or a prohibited form of freedom of expression (2018), I wonder if this could still be 
considered freedom of expression or if this could be considered a violation of this particular 
right.   
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In 1970 Richard Handyside, the owner of a publisher firm named “Stage 1” in London, 
published a book called The Little Red Schoolbook. The book was designed for youngsters and 
contained chapters on sexual intercourse (Richard Handyside v. the United Kingdom 
(application no. 5493/72), 1976). Richard Handyside received a lot of criticism on the contents 
of his book. The criticism and the number of complaints made to the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor resulted into Richard Handyside being summoned before the British Court on the 
charge that he possessed obscene books for publication for gain. The British Court found 
Richard Handyside guilty of this charge. He was ordered to pay a fine and all the confiscated 
books were destroyed by the police, on orders of the British Court (Richard Handyside v. the 
United Kingdom (application no. 5493/72), 1976). Richard Handyside paid the fine but was, 
nevertheless, of the opinion that his right to freedom of expression as laid down in the 
Convention was violated. Therefore, Richard Handyside appealed to the ECtHR which 
examined his case and concluded that the British Court had violated Richard Handyside’s right 
to freedom of expression. 
In Handyside, the ECtHR states that freedom of expression is one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society. Furthermore, in this case the ECtHR states that freedom 
of expression is “applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population. [That] are the demands of [that] pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society.’ This means 
that, among other things, every ‘formality’, ‘condition’, ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed on 
this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Richard Handyside v. the 
United Kingdom (application no. 5493/72), 1976). The ECtHR concludes its Handyside ruling 
with “from another standpoint, whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes ‘duties 
and responsibilities’ the scope of which depends on his situation and the technical means he 
uses.” (Richard Handyside v. the United Kingdom (application no. 5493/72), 1976). In other 
words, the ECtHR clarifies that when people wish to make use of their right to freedom of 
expression, they should be aware that this right carries duties and responsibilities. People thus 
cannot completely express themselves in the manner they wish when engaging with their right 
to freedom of expression, despite the fact that in the Handyside case, the ECtHR holds that 
freedom of expression represents ideas that shock, disturb or offend the State or any sector of 
the population.   
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The ECtHR re-emphasises the significance of the duties and responsibilities that come 
with exercising the right to freedom of expression in the case of Otto Preminger Institut v. 
Austria (application no. 13470/87) (Otto Preminger) (Pégorier, 2018). In the case of Otto 
Preminger, the ECtHR clarifies that “duties and responsibilities of this right include an 
obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and 
thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public 
debate or furthering progress in human affairs.” (Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria (application 
no. 13470/87), 1994, para. 49). In Otto Preminger, the ECtHR thus holds that people can 
exercise their right to freedom of expression and that this right may shock, offend or disturb the 
population but if the expressions of freedom go beyond that (i.e. discriminate others) and no 
longer contribute to any form of public debate, people should not exercise their right to freedom 
of expression.  
The ECtHR expands its Otto Preminger reasoning in the case of Erbakan v. Turkey 
(application no. 59405/00) (Erbakan). In Erbakan, the ECtHR points out that “tolerance and 
respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, 
pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in 
certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, 
incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance …, provided that any ‘formalities’, 
‘conditions’, ‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’ imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.” (Erbakan v. Turkey (application no. 59405/00), 2006, para. 56). Again the ECtHR 
highlights that people can make use of their right to freedom of expression but only if that 
speech does not incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance.  
The aforementioned paragraphs, indicate that the ECtHR holds freedom of expression 
to be one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. Furthermore, it can be said that 
the ECtHR interprets freedom of expression as a freedom that is not only applicable to 
information and ideas that, inter alia, are favourably received but also as a freedom that is 
applicable to information and ideas that shock, disturb or offend the State or any sector of the 
population. However, this does not mean that people have the absolute freedom to speak their 
minds, neither offline nor online, because the right to freedom of expression carries duties and 
responsibilities with it. As stated before, the duties and responsibilities clause was introduced 
by the ECtHR in the case of Handyside. The significance of this clause was re-emphasised by 
the ECtHR in the case of Otto Preminger and got expanded by the ECtHR in the case of 
Erbakan. Noteworthy about the duties and responsibilities clause in the cases of Otto Preminger 
and Erbakan is that the ECtHR holds that speech that is offensive or shocking and, which might 
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constitute an infringement of the right of others, should be avoided. This is noteworthy because 
it seems to contradict the ECtHR’s view that the freedom of expression also applies to 
information and ideas that might shock, disturb or offend others. In these cases, the ECtHR 
holds as well that every type of speech which spreads, incites, promotes or justifies hatred based 
on intolerance should be sanctioned or even be prevented from being said or written. 
 
2.3. The ECtHR: hate speech  
Hate speech forms an interesting concept within the notion of freedom of expression 
and the ECtHR’s duties and responsibilities clause for a couple of reasons. The first reason is 
that hate speech might consist of information and ideas that shock, offend or disturb the State 
or any sector of the population. The second reason is that hate speech might also be considered 
as a type of speech which spreads, incites, promotes or justifies hatred based on intolerance. 
Based on the ECtHR’s clear stance on what applies to freedom of expression and the 
significance of the duties and responsibilities that come with this right, one would expect that 
when the ECtHR is presented with a case that entails hate speech, it would have a clear view 
on when the concept of hate speech falls outside the scope of freedom of expression and 
therefore does not enjoy any form of protection under Article 10 ECHR. When this occurs, 
Article 17 ECHR1 applies to the case involved. Also, one would expect that the ECtHR would 
have a clear view on when the concept of hate speech falls inside or outside the scope of 
freedom of expression and therefore might be a justification of an interference with the scope 
of freedom of expression. This seems to be true for the former but not for the latter, however.  
 
The case law of the ECtHR on hate speech in which Article 17 ECHR is applied 
demonstrates that the ECtHR has a clear view on when cases that involve hate speech fall inside 
the scope of Article 17 ECHR and therefore cannot rely on the protection of Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR emphasised this in the case of Seurot v. France (application no. 57383/00) when it 
held that “[t] here is no doubt that any remark directed against the Convention’s underlying 
values would be removed from protection of Article 10 [freedom of expression] by Article 17 
[prohibition of abuse of rights].” (Seurot v. France (application no. 57383/00), 2004, p. 1). In 
line with its viewpoint in Seurot, the ECtHR has declared all cases that fall inside the scope of 
Article 17 ECHR concerning hate speech manifestly ill-founded and therefore, inadmissible 
(European Court of Human Rights, 2019). All of these cases involve either clear ethnic, racial 
                                                          
1 Article 17 ECHRis the Article on the prohibition of abuse of rights.  
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or religious hate or deny the existence of the Holocaust (i.e. negationism and revisionism) 
(European Court of Human Rights, 2019). The most seminal of these cases are the cases of 
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (application no. 35222/04), W.P. and Others v. Poland (application no. 
42264/98), Garaudy v. France (application no. 65831/01), Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the 
Netherlands (application no. 8348/78 and 8406/78 (joined)) and Norwood v. the United 
Kingdom (application no. 23131/03). 
 
The ECtHR’s interpretation of whether or not hate speech is a justification of an 
interference with the scope of freedom of expression is inconsistent when it comes to cases that 
deal with hate speech and freedom of expression. The cases that best demonstrate the ECtHR’s 
inconsistency in this regard are the cases of Jersild v. Denmark (application no. 15890/89) 
(Jersild) and Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden (application no. 1813/07) (Vejdeland). The 
Jersild case handles a Danish journalist, Jens Jersild, who works for a Danish radio station. In 
response to an earlier published article in which a group called ‘the Greenjackets’ expressed 
their views towards migrants in Denmark, Jens Jersild decided to interview the Greenjackets 
for a documentary that he was working on. During the interview the Greenjackets “made 
abusive and derogatory remarks about immigrants and ethnic groups in Denmark.” (Jersild v. 
Denmark (application no. 15890/89), 1994, para. 10). Their remarks were broadcasted by the 
Danish radio and eventually led to the conviction of the Greenjackets and Jens Jersild himself. 
The case reached the ECtHR and it stated that “there can be no doubt that the remarks in respect 
of which the Greenjackets were convicted were more than insulting to members of the targeted 
groups and did not enjoy the protection of Article 10 […] It is moreover undisputed that the 
purpose of the applicant [Jens Jersild] in compiling the broadcast in question was not racist. 
Although he relied on the proceedings, it does appear from the reasoning in the relevant 
judgements that they took such a factor into account.” (Jersild v. Denmark (application no. 
15890/89), 1994, para. 35-36). The ECtHR ended its reasoning in Jersild by concluding there 
had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. With its ruling in Jersild, the ECtHR states that hate 
speech cannot be seen as a justification of an interference with the scope of freedom of 
expression. However, the ECtHR came to a different conclusion in the case of Vejdeland. In 
Vejdeland, the ECtHR had to decide whether the circulation of leaflets in a secondary school 
was a violation of freedom of expression. The information on the leaflets expressed the 
distributers discontent for homosexuals and their behaviour. Although the ECtHR reasoned in 
Vejdeland that “attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering 
specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour combating racist 
Van Vaals 
11 
 
speech in the face of freedom of expression in an irresponsible manner, [which] is as serious as 
discrimination based on ‘race, origin and colour’” (Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden 
(application no. (1813/07), 2012, para. 55), the ECtHR found that the right to freedom of 
expression was not violated. In Vejdeland, the ECtHR thus held that hate speech can be seen as 
a justification of an interference with the scope of freedom of expression.  
 
When it comes to cases that deal with online hate speech a similar pattern is noticeable. 
This pattern is best demonstrated with the cases of Delfi and Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt. V. Hungary (application no. 22947/13) (MTE and Index).  
In Delfi, the ECtHR had to decide on whether or not Delfi2 could be held accountable 
for comments posted by third parties that had been in violation of Delfi’s freedom to impart 
information (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09), 2015). When the ECtHR examined 
the Delfi case, it “found that the Estonian court’s finding of liability against Delfi had been a 
justified and proportionate restriction on the portal’s freedom of expression, in particular, 
because the comments in question had been extreme and had been posted on reaction to an 
article published by Delfi in its professionally managed news portal run on a commercial basis; 
the steps taken by Delfi to remove the offensive comments without delay after the publication 
had been insufficient; and the 320 euro fine had by no means been excessive for Delfi, one of 
the largest Internet portals in Estonia.” (European Court of Human Rights, 2015, para. 7). Based 
on this examination the ECtHR holds that there had been no violation of Article 10 ECHR. In 
other words, the ECtHR rules that Delfi could be held liable for the comments posted on their 
website by third parties and that this did not breach its right to impart information. The ECtHR 
also holds that online hate speech can be seen as a justification of an interference with the scope 
of freedom of expression. Furthermore, the ECtHR holds that holding Delfi liable was a 
proportionate restriction on Delfi’s freedom of expression. Here, the ECtHR indicates that while 
Delfi may have freedom of expression, it also has duties and responsibilities concerning this 
right that it has to take into account. The ECtHR finds that Delfi had not sufficiently taken these 
duties and responsibilities into account because the comments were extreme in nature and 
removed six weeks after the comments were published. 
The case of MTE and Index3 also concerns the liability of Internet news portals with 
regards to online hate speech and freedom of expression. In this case the ECtHR had to decide 
whether or not MTE and Index could be held liable for online comments that are of a rude and 
                                                          
2 See chapter 5 section 5.2 for background information on the Delfi case. 
3 See chapter 5 section 5.5 for background information on the MTE and Index case.  
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despicable nature posted by third parties on their websites. After the ECtHR examined the case 
presented to them, it came to the conclusion that MTE’s and Index’ right to freedom of 
expression had been violated. The ECtHR based its rulings on the consideration that the 
Hungarian courts had not properly balanced the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
reputation of others when deciding of MTE and Index could be held liable for the online 
comments posted on their website by third parties. Furthermore, the ECtHR held that there had 
been a violation of freedom of expression because the “notice-and-take-me-down-system” of 
both news portals functions as an appropriate tool in the majority of the cases for balancing the 
interests and rights of all of those involved. For this reason, the ECtHR finds that this system is 
able to provide adequate protection for the reputation of others (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (application no. 22947/13), 2016).  With its reasoning 
in MTE and Index, the ECtHR states that online hate speech cannot be seen as a justification of 
an interference with the scope of freedom of expression.  
The aforementioned cases indeed demonstrate that the ECtHR’s interpretation on 
whether or not hate speech is a justification of an interference with the scope of freedom of 
expression is inconsistent. The ECtHR’s inconsistent view makes it difficult to review how the 
ECtHR interprets hate speech. However, what can be argued is that when speech amounts to 
Holocaust denial or clear ethnic, racial or religious hate speech, this speech does not benefit 
from protection under Article 10 ECHR because the ECtHR interprets this as hate speech.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The first aim of this chapter was to review the level of protection that the ECtHR can 
give to hate speech when it falls inside the scope of freedom of expression. The second aim was 
to review the level of protection that the ECtHR can give to hate speech when it falls outside 
the scope of freedom of expression. Based on its case law, it can be said that the level of 
protection that the ECtHR can give to hate speech is unclear and case dependent when hate 
speech falls inside the scope of freedom of expression. This is unclear because the ECtHR is 
inconsistent in its interpretation whether or not the hate speech in question is a justification of 
an interference with the scope of freedom of expression. However, based on the relevant case 
law, it is clear that the level of protection that the ECtHR can give to hate speech that falls 
outside the scope of freedom of expression is non-existent. Additionally, this chapter reviewed 
how the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom of expression. Based on the case of  Handyside, 
it can be concluded that the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom of expression as being 
applicable to information and ideas that are, inter alia, regarded as inoffensive but also to those 
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that offend, shock and disturb. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the ECtHR interprets the 
notion of freedom of expression as a right that is not absolute because this right has duties and 
responsibilities that should be taken into account by its users.  
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Chapter 3 Literature review  
  
3.1 Introduction  
Many aspects of the digital society that people live in today are welcomed, as they are 
perceived as innovative and efficient. People can make payments with their smartphones or 
watches, houses are being secured via applications on digital devices, friends and family are 
updated via social media whenever and wherever the person in question wishes and Skype 
seems to become redundant with the numerous video call possibilities on applications such as 
WhatsApp, FaceTime, Facebook Messenger, Google Hangout and Instagram Video Chat. 
Despite the fact that the rise of the Internet and the advantages of technology are becoming 
more and more intertwined with everyday life, they are also the cause of many different 
problems. One of these problems is the dissemination of hate speech online. The wide 
availability of technology and strong presence of social media in everyday life allows people to 
speak their minds online without interference or immediate monitoring. This can range from 
complementing on how adorable a baby looks to completely denigrating a person for their 
appearance, faith or cultural background. Often when people speak their minds online, they do 
not think about the consequences for themselves nor the people or entities their comments are 
addressed to. Presumably the act of posting comments online is part of the belief that is justified, 
because they are entitled to freedom of expression. Given the fact that in Handyside, the ECtHR 
held that freedom of expression also applies to information and ideas that shock, offend or 
disturb and given the fact that the World Wide Web is a rather new realm4 in the domain of 
freedom of expression, scholars wonder if placing hateful comments online falls within the 
scope of freedom of expression. Furthermore, scholars wonder: to what extent are interferences 
with online hate speech, insofar as it does fall under the scope of freedom of expression, 
justified?  
This chapter will review the relevant academic literature on the notion of freedom of 
expression and hate speech and it will aim to describe the scope and possible limitations of both 
notions.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The World Wide Web was invented in 1989 by British scientist Tim Burners-Lee but was introduced to the 
public in 1993 (CERN, 2019).   
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3.2 Freedom of expression 
In Handyside, the ECtHR held that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society. Bleich (2011) agrees and points out that the right to 
freedom of expression together with the right to freedom of opinion have been the core of liberal 
democracies for thousands of years. Bangstad (2014) adds that freedom of expression plays a 
central role in any democratic, liberal and secular society. To understand these statements fully, 
it is necessary to clarify what the right to freedom of expression entails, and what the scope and 
limitations of this are. Article 10(1) ECHR clarifies that everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression and that this right entails the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
[Article 10(1)] shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, televisions 
or cinema enterprises.” (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950, p. 6). In other words, the right to freedom of expression entails that people 
may have thoughts and opinions which they are able to express and that they may receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference of the government. Article 10(1) ECHR can 
be regarded as the scope of freedom of expression. However, as has been pointed out by the 
ECtHR in its case law on freedom of expression, the right to freedom of expression does not 
mean that people can express their thoughts, opinions or ideas wherever they are and whenever 
they please because the right to freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities. 
These duties and responsibilities should be taken into account when exercising the right to 
freedom of expression. Flaus (2009) highlights that the duty of the people who have the right 
to freedom of expression and who need to take into account the accompanying duties and 
responsibilities was put into the Convention for the reason to make people aware of the 
distinctive identity of freedom of expression and to prevent the dangerous and irresponsible use 
of democracy. The duties and responsibilities of the right to freedom of expression are set out 
in Article 10(2) ECHR. It reads that “the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.” (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950, p. 6). The fact that the right to freedom of expression has duties and 
responsibilities which may be subject to certain limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
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necessary in a democratic society demonstrates that the right to freedom of expression is not 
absolute, which is underlined by Eberle (2004), Rorive (2009) and Bangstad (2014). This means 
that, as stipulated in the Article 10(2) ECHR, the right to freedom of expression can be limited 
if the alleged interferences are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. 
McGonagle (2013) highlights that the ECtHR justifies this approach by connecting the 
permissibility of limitations to the right to the existence of duties and responsibilities which 
govern its exercises.  
So, when citizens of democratic societies in Europe engage with their right to freedom 
of expression, they should take into account that this right carries duties and responsibilities. 
Moreover, they should be aware of the fact that these duties and responsibilities can limit their 
right to freedom of expression because this right may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.  
 
3.3 Hate speech 
3.3.1. Definitions of hate speech 
In Handyside, the ECtHR states that freedom of expression is not only applicable to 
information and ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive but also applies 
to those that offend, shock or disturb others. The interpretation of the ECtHR on freedom of 
expression implies that hate speech is also included in the ECtHR’s perception of freedom of 
expression because, as mentioned in the previous chapter of this research, hate speech can also 
contain information or ideas that shock, offend or disturb others. While the ECtHR itself does 
not shed a clear light on this assumption, it can be said that hate speech is a remarkable concept 
within the notion of freedom of expression because it seeks for a balance between this right and 
the prohibition of discrimination (Van Vaals, 2018). While Boyle (2001) claims that hate 
speech is criticised in all democratic societies, Álvarez-Benjumea and Winter (2018) argue that 
hate speech might install fear which could result into people excluding themselves from public 
debate. The question remains: what is hate speech, and what are the scope and limitations of 
hate speech?  
Álvarez-Benjumea and Winter (2018) define hate speech as speech that intends to 
promote hatred on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Knechtle (2008) 
sees hate speech as speech that can take the form of fighting words, defamation and incitement 
or actual imminent violence. Boyle (2001) adds that hate speech describes a difficult category 
of speech and comparable freedoms in that it involves the advocacy of discrimination and hatred 
against groups based on their race, colour, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religious beliefs or other 
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status. An example of Boyle’s definition of hate speech are the statements of the Polish 
governing party Law and Justice on how gay people pose an imminent threat to the traditional 
Polish family and how these people pose a threat to Polish society in general in early April 2019 
(Berendt, 2019). Boyle (2001) highlights that hate speech can also be expressed in other 
manners than racial and ethnic hate speech. One of these ways is online hate speech. The 
European Commission (2018) typifies online hate speech, illegal online hate speech in 
particular, as the public incitement to violence or hatred directed to groups or individuals on 
the basis of certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or 
ethnic origin. Additionally, Brown (2018) sees this sub-category of hate speech as 
heterogeneous and dynamic: it can take many different forms and shapes and those forms and 
shapes can change and expand over relatively short amounts of time. As mentioned in the 
introduction (see section 3.1), online hate speech proves to be a problem on the Internet. One 
problem with online hate speech, as I (2018) point out in my paper on hate speech, is that people 
taking part in online hate speech can remain anonymous. Brown (2018) confirms the problem 
of anonymity as he clarifies that anonymity, or even the perception of it, can lessen the threshold 
for people to be more outrageous, hateful or rude in what they express than they would have 
ever been in reality. Brown (2018) also categorises invisibility, the sense of having or belonging 
to an online community and the instantaneousness of the Internet as reasons why online hate 
speech proves to be a problem in the online world. In my paper on hate speech, I (2018) argue 
that the rapid digitalisation of today’s society and the increasing influence of social media in 
everyday life are two other reasons why disseminating hate speech online proves to be an issue 
in the online world. The issues of online hate speech are confirmed by the results of the 2016 
Eurobarometer on media pluralism and democracy. The results of the Eurobarometer (2016) 
show that 75 per cent of the participants taking part in online discussions have witnessed threats, 
abuse or hate speech aimed at bloggers, people active on social media or journalists. 50 per cent 
of the participants indicated that these instances were reasons for them to no longer participate 
in online discussions. In my hate speech paper, I (2018) argue that the results of the 2016 
Eurobarometer are telling because it might restrict the participants right to freedom of 
expression online. Álvarez-Benjumea and Winter (2018) underline this by highlighting that 
hate speech can install fear which can result into people excluding themselves from 
participating in public debates. This in turn can have a negative effect on their freedom of 
expression online and can contribute to a toxic online environment.   
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3.3.2. The ECtHR’s approach towards assessing hate speech 
Despite the fact that European countries have limited hate speech, Oetheimer (2009) 
holds that it is hard to determine whether or not hate speech is covered by the scope of Article 
10 ECHR. The ECtHR is known not to use precise categorisations on what is covered by the 
scope of Article 10 ECHR and what is not. Tulkens (2015) highlights that the ECtHR prefers 
to work on a case by case basis in which it examines each case individually to see whether or 
not the case in question is admissible and if so, if there has been a violation of the rights set out 
in the Convention. Another reason why the ECtHR favours to work on a case by case basis is 
that, in this manner, the ECtHR is not constrained by its own reasoning and its own case law 
definitions. This means that the ECtHR’s power or line of reasoning is not constrained or set 
for future cases with similar topics (Tulkens, 2015). Additionally, Tulkens (2015) points out 
that the ECtHR favours the meaning of an autonomous conception of certain notions. Oetheimer 
(2009) argues that this is visible in the ECtHR’s case law on hate speech.  
The fact that the ECtHR prefers the use of an autonomous conception of certain notions 
might explain why the ECtHR itself has not yet defined the concept of hate speech. Tulkens 
(2015) indicates that in the case of Gündüz v. Turkey (application no. 35071/97) the ECtHR did 
explicitly refer to the definition of hate speech set out in Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on “hate speech”. In this Recommendation, the 
Committee of Ministers defines hate speech as speech “covering all forms of expressions which 
spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobic, anti-Semitism or other forms of 
hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of 
immigrant origin.” (Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on “hate speech”, 1997, p. 107).  
Tulkens (2015) points out that when the ECtHR is presented with a case that deals with 
the incitement to hatred and freedom of expression, it can either make use of the broader 
approach of exclusion or of the narrower approach of restrictions. The exclusion approach 
entails that hate speech is excluded from the protection of the Convention provided for by 
Article 17 which prohibits the abuse of rights. The narrower approach means that hate speech 
can be restricted because of the limitations of freedom of expression set out in Article 10(2) 
ECHR (Tulkens, 2015). Oetheimer (2009) confirms that the ECtHR indeed has two approaches 
when it comes to cases that deal with the incitement to hatred and freedom of expression. 
Oetheimer (2009) holds that the ECtHR refuses to make use of the guarantees of Article 10 
ECHR if the Court is presented with a case that involves Holocaust denial or outright 
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xenophobic or racist speech. Oetheimer (2009) also states that when the ECtHR is presented 
with a case in which it is not certain if the hateful character of the impugned speech constitutes 
a violation of Article 10 ECHR, it will apply a proportionality test. Kiska (2012) explains that 
with this test the ECtHR analyses whether the alleged violation of Article 10 ECHR serves a 
legitimate aim, is necessary in a democratic society and is prescribed by law. Both approaches 
and the proportionality test are illustrated in the ECtHR’s case law that deals with incitement 
to hatred and freedom of expression. It should be noted that when the ECtHR applies Article 
17 ECHR, Article 10 ECHR can no longer be used because Article 17 ECHR excludes the use 
of Article 10 ECHR (Tulkens, 2015).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the notion of freedom of expression and hate 
speech in order to answer the question whether or not online hate speech would fall into the 
scope of Article 10 ECHR. Based on the relevant academic literature it can be concluded that 
freedom of expression entails that everyone has the freedom to have opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without public authorities having a say in this. The scope of 
freedom of expression is found in Article 10(1) ECHR. Furthermore, the relevant academic 
literature shows that the right to freedom of expression can be restricted because of the duties 
and responsibilities it carries. The restrictions on the right to freedom of expression are set out 
in Article 10(2) ECHR. Many academics have shown that it is difficult to define hate speech. 
Yet all definitions on hate speech mention that hate speech is speech designed to promote hatred 
on the basis of religion, national origin, race or ethnicity (Rosenfeld, 2003). In this paper hate 
speech is connected to freedom of expression and therefore, hate speech does not have a scope 
of its own but is linked to the scope of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, it remains difficult 
to determine whether or not hate speech, and therewith online hate speech, falls within the scope 
of freedom of expression. This is confirmed in the ECtHR’s approach in dealing with cases that 
are concerned with the incitement of hatred and freedom of expression. However, the ECtHR’s 
approach on cases dealing with hate speech and freedom of expression confirms that it is crystal 
clear that when hate speech qualifies as speech that is outright xenophobic or racial or denies 
the existence of the Holocaust, it falls outside the scope of freedom of expression. 
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Chapter 4 Research design 
 
4.1 Theory 
4.1.1. The theory of the marketplace of ideas 
Bleich (2014) points out that the U.S Supreme Court and the ECtHR both hold a 
considerable amount of power in the United States and in Europe for drawing the line between 
free speech and hate speech. This means that both Courts can regulate free speech and freedom 
of expression. The U.S. Supreme Court and the ECtHR hold the power to determine whether 
or not hate speech falls within or outside the scope of free speech and freedom of expression. 
Therefore, both Courts can decide whether or not hate speech is or is not protected by the First 
Amendment of the American Constitution or the Convention or can decide whether or not an 
interference with the right to free speech and freedom of expression is justified. Bleich (2014) 
highlights that the ECtHR has issued very important judgments on freedom of expression from 
the 1960s onwards, but the U.S. Supreme Court regulates free speech since the 1920s. 
According to Blocher (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court regulates free speech by making use of 
the theory of the marketplace of ideas, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.   
The theory of the marketplace of ideas finds its origin in the case of Abrams v. the United 
States (250 US 616). In this case Supreme Court Justice Holmes dissented from the main 
conclusion and stated that “[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best of 
the truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and 
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate 
is the theory of our Constitution.” (Abrams v. the United States (250 US 616), 1919, para. 630). 
Coase (1977) explains Holmes’ words in the following manner: “the rationale of the First 
Amendment is that only if an idea is subject to competition on the marketplace can it be 
discovered (through acceptance or rejection) whether it is false or not.” (Coase, 1977, p. 27). In 
other words, the marketplace of ideas is about a market where good and bad ideas compete for 
the truth and where one of the two will prevail based on what is believed to be true or false. 
Blocher (2008) adds that in the marketplace of ideas theory people should not be afraid of bad 
ideas much like they should not be afraid of bad products or services because they will not win 
from better competitors, as long as all are freely available. Blocher (2008) continues to add that 
John Milton’s Areopagitica can be seen as an intellectual predecessor to Holmes’ theory of the 
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marketplace of ideas. In Areopagitica, John Milton (1644) wrote “let [truth] and falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to worse in a free and open encounter.” (quoted from Blocher, 
2008). Both Holmes and Milton hold that truth is best achieved by the free and competitive 
exchange of ideas (Blocher, 2008). Oster seems to agree as he (2015) argues that the argument 
from truth safeguards freedom of expression for the reason that truth is best reached and 
falsehoods best undermined, when they face each other through free expression.   
Often times the marketplace of ideas is compared with the market of free goods and 
services and just like this market, the marketplace of ideas does not always function properly. 
Economists describe this as market failures. Blocher (2008) explains that the market failures in 
the theory of the marketplace of ideas arise from the fact that the marketplace of ideas is seen 
as a costless, uninhibited and perfectly efficient free market, a view which is neoclassical and 
which is not realistic. Coase (1977) describes this view as unsympathetic to what is going on in 
the real world. It is, however a view that has grown on neoclassical economists and therefore 
they live comfortably in their world without any worries (cited from Blocher, 2008). Critics 
argue that the market failures lead to unfair competition on the marketplace of ideas because 
contesters may not see eye to eye about what constitutes a good idea or might not recognise one 
when good ideas are presented to them. Proponents of theory of the marketplace of ideas argue 
that market failures can be solved by allowing speech to be regulated. It should be noted that 
speech regulations are only allowed when the market fails. 
 
4.1.2. The remedy of more speech 
Another theory that features prominently in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the regulation of free speech is the remedy of more speech. This remedy was introduced by 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in the case of Whitney v. California (274 U.S. 357). 
Blocher (2008) argues that Brandeis’ remedy of more speech is a ‘revisited and re-endorsed 
marketplace metaphor’ taken from a different angle as Brandeis holds that “freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth,” and that when bad ideas or falsehoods appear, “the remedy to be applied is more 
speech and not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” (Whitney v. 
California (274 U.S. 357 1927), 1927, para. 375-377). With his remedy, Brandeis argues that 
bad speech can be countered with more speech and that bad speech cannot be countered by 
silencing or restricting this type of speech. However, Blocher (2008) points out that when bad 
speech is seen as hate speech, it can be considered a market failure. The reason behind this is, 
according to Blocher (2008), that hate speech can cause harm which cannot be softened or 
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redeemed by more speech; “because hate speech disempowers those at whom it is directed, the 
argument goes that anti-hate speech and anti-fighting words have no real chance to “compete”.” 
(Blocher, 2008, p. 835). Yet, it has to be said that despite the market failures, the U.S. Supreme 
Court continues to use the theory of the marketplace of ideas as justification for the broad 
protection of free speech and does not use the market failures as limitations for free speech 
(Blocher, 2008). 
 
4.1.3. The ECtHR: the theory of the marketplace of ideas and the remedy of more 
speech 
From its case law and the literature on freedom of expression and hate speech, it 
becomes evident that the ECtHR has a different approach when it comes to the protection of 
freedom of expression and the regulation of hate speech than the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet, the 
applied theory in this research is the theory of the marketplace of ideas in combination with 
Brandeis’ remedy of more speech. It is important to note that in this research, the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas and Brandeis’ remedy are not applied in the traditional fashion but in an 
unconventional manner. This means that both approaches are deemed to have a negative effect 
rather than a positive effect on the regulation and protection of free speech and freedom of 
expression.  
 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Research methods 
This research will use qualitative research as a method. The primary focus of this 
research in terms of conducting research is to conduct legal research. Blechner (2018) explains 
that conducting legal research roughly consists of four steps: to get started, to consult secondary 
sources, to find primary authority and to update and analyse the controlling law.  
Fischer and Julsing (2007) clarify that when research is conducted, it needs to be reliable 
and needs to have a decent score on validity. This research is reliable because it is very likely 
that when other researchers use the same or comparable sources, they will come to the same 
outcome(s). Despite the fact that both the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) issue judgements in the field of human rights protection, the outcome(s) of this 
research cannot be generalised to the CJEU or other regional human rights courts. The reason 
for this is that the CJEU has taken a different stance on what defines freedom of expression 
which becomes clear in the case of Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de 
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Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12). The research will 
receive a decent score on validity because it is assumed that the sources are researched based, 
peer reviewed and written by well-established scholars within the field of human rights 
protection. 
 
4.2.2. Research question, hypothesis and definitions 
The research question that this study tries to answer is: “To what extent does the 
European Court of Human Rights treat online hate speech as being protected by freedom of 
expression?” The hypothesis of this research is that it is case dependent whether or not the 
ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. This hypothesis 
is based on the information that the ECtHR is known to make use of a case-by-case approach  
when it deals with cases that concern hate speech and freedom of expression (Oetheimer, 2009; 
Tulkens, 2015). In other words, when the ECtHR has to issue a judgement in a case that 
concerns hate speech, it will look at each case individually in order to determine whether or not 
the harmful speech constitutes hate speech as being excluded from the scope of Article 10 
ECHR by virtue of Article 17 ECHR or if that hate speech constitutes a justification of an 
interference with the scope of freedom of expression (i.e. whether or not the interference was 
necessary in a democratic society, prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim).  
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, two terms that are mentioned in the research 
question need further elaboration. These two terms are the right to freedom of expression and 
the notion of hate speech. In this paper the right to freedom of expression can be interpreted as 
how it has been formulated in the Convention. The Convention reads that everyone is entitled 
to express themselves freely and that the right to freedom of expression includes “the freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authorities and regardless of frontiers.” (1950, p. 6). Furthermore, the Convention reads that the 
right to freedom of expression “shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, televisions or cinema enterprises.” (1950, p. 6). Hate speech in this paper can be 
interpreted as speech that has the intent to spread, incite or promote hatred, whether 
anonymously or non-anonymously, offline or online, spoken or written on the basis of race 
religion, gender, ethnicity, cultural background or sexual orientation. Moreover, in this paper 
hate speech, which also includes the sub-category online hate speech, can be interpreted not 
only simply as words but also as speech that actually incites hatred towards others. Oster (2015) 
explains that “’hate speech’ is, in linguistic terms, a perlocutionary speech act, that is, an act 
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not aimed at reaching understanding, but a strategic action that follows another goal. Therefore, 
hate speech not merely incite action; hate speech is action. Hate speech is significant not 
because of what language says, but of what it does.” (p. 224). Tulkens (2015) adds that this 
approach towards hate speech is called speech act theory. According to this approach, certain 
outings do not just ‘sound’ in the semiotic space of oral expressions, images and lyrics and 
written acts but perform as acts, bringing clear consequences with legal implications (Tulkens, 
2015).   
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Chapter 5 Liability and online hate speech 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Article 10 ECHR clarifies that everyone has the right to freedom of expression and that 
this right is subject to certain limitations, which has been discussed in section 3.2. Article 10 
ECHR does not mention that the word everyone also includes, for example, online business. 
This leads to the question if online businesses have a right to freedom of expression. If online 
businesses do have this right, they need to take into account the duties and responsibilities of 
this right just like citizens have to. Given the fact that online businesses interact with their 
audience by publishing news articles or opinion pieces and vice versa by responding in 
comments. Two more questions can be raised based on this interaction: 1) who carries the 
responsibility for these comments, and 2) to what degree can the audience express their opinion 
without immediate monitoring? The ECtHR seems to answer these questions in the cases of 
Delfi and MTE and Index. The first question constitutes the aim of this chapter.  
 
5.2 Delfi AS 
Delfi AS is a public company and owns of one of the biggest Internet news websites in 
Estonia, publishing up to 330 articles a day. In one of these articles, the readers were informed 
about a ferry company wanting to alter their route to reach certain islands faster. Shortly after 
this was announced, it was revealed that the newly chosen route would bring damage to the 
water and the ice caps and the actual decision was therefore postponed for a number of weeks. 
Though the website is hosted by Delfi, the readers were able to place comments and to access 
the comments placed by others under the article. The ferry company article received 185 
comments, more than 20 of which contained severe threats aimed at the ferry owner and the 
operator. The comments were considered to be of a very rude nature (Delfi AS v. Estonia 
(application no. 64569/09), 2015). The ferry company’s lawyers requested for Delfi to remove 
the comments, which they did in March 2006 (i.e. six weeks after the comments were 
published). Delfi was sued by the owner of the ferry company who successfully won his case. 
Delfi did not agree with the proceedings and appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the previous judgement rejecting Delfi’s argument that they could not be held 
liable under the Information Society Service Act (i.e. Directive 2000/31/EC). Unsatisfied with 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling Delfi appealed to the Estonian Supreme Court who also rejected 
Delfi’s claim and confirmed the Court of Appeal’s ruling (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 
64569/09), 2015). Since Delfi believed that they could not be held liable for the comments 
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posted by third parties on their website, it eventually appealed to the ECtHR. The ECtHR 
examined the case and held that there had been no violation of Article 10 ECHR.  
In Delfi, the ECtHR thus stated that Delfi could and should be held accountable for the 
comments posted on their website by others and that this did not breach their right to impart 
information. The ECtHR’s judgement in Delfi is interesting because it is the first case in which 
the ECtHR had to analyse whether an Internet news portal could be held liable for comments 
posted by third parties (European Court of Human Rights, 2015). The fact that the ECtHR held 
Delfi liable for the user-generated comments on their website caused a stir in the ‘world of 
Internet portals’. Susi (2014) highlights that many international financial portals strongly 
opposed the ECtHR’s decision on the grounds that it departs from the conventional approach 
to liability for anonymous comments. Susi (2014) also highlights that the ruling could have far-
reaching consequences for the freedom of anonymity and Internet liability. The ECtHR’s 
judgement in Delfi also stood out internationally, because Estonia is globally known to have a 
good reputation for its press and Internet freedoms (Susi, 2014).  
Regardless of the fact that Delfi indeed has enjoyed press and internet freedoms, in Delfi 
the ECtHR reasons that holding Delfi liable was a proportionate restriction of the Internet news 
portal’s freedom of expression. The ECtHR stresses that while Delfi may have freedom of 
expression, it also has duties and responsibilities that it has to take into account. With this line 
of thought, the ECtHR not only upholds its own reasoning when it comes to the significance of 
duties and responsibilities of the right to freedom of expression but also expands this 
significance from the offline world to the online world. To explain, Delfi might be situated in 
Estonia, that is to say in a physical building, it, however, operates as an Internet news portal 
that publishes their articles online and that can be accessed anywhere in the world. The ECtHR 
found that Delfi had not sufficiently taken their duties and responsibilities of their right to 
freedom of expression into account, because the comments were extreme in nature and only 
removed six weeks after they were published. Susi (2014) highlights that the ECtHR’s 
reasoning resonates with the Estonian Appeal and Supreme Court. In the domestic proceedings, 
both Courts had decided that Delfi’s right to freedom of expression did not cover rude and 
denigrating comments on their websites, which went beyond acceptable criticism and resulted 
in direct insults (Susi, 2014). Following the domestic Courts reasoning, the ECtHR upholds its 
own reasoning that “concrete expression constituting hate speech, […], are not protected by 
Article 10 of the Convention.” (Gündüz, v. Turkey, (application no. 35071/97), 2003, para. 41).  
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5.3 Delfi: the marketplace of ideas  
The fact that Delfi is held liable for comments placed by third parties that are extreme 
in nature, go beyond acceptable criticism, and result into direct insults, goes against the 
principles of the marketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas holds that good and bad ideas 
should compete with one another in order for the correct idea or the truth to come forward. To 
hold someone accountable for the truth, which in this case are the comments with an extreme 
nature, implicates a restriction of the right to free speech, which is uncommon within this 
theory. In the marketplace of ideas it is agreed upon that it should be possible to utter words, 
regardless of their content. This standpoint is confirmed in the case of Cox v. State of Louisiana 
(397 U.S. 536 1965), in which, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that the “function of free 
speech […] is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to 
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for the acceptance of an idea. 
That is why freedom of speech is protected against censorship or punishment. There is no room 
[…] for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardisation of ideas either 
by legislatures, courts or dominant political or community groups.” (Cox v. State of Louisiana 
(379 U.S. 636 1965), 1965, para. 551-52).  
The fact that most European countries have enacted legislation to restrict hate speech 
and therewith regulate freedom of expression demonstrates that the standardisation of ideas by 
legislatures is accepted. In addition, the fact that the ECtHR consistently declares cases 
inadmissible that constitute clear racial, ethnic or religious speech or Holocaust denial 
demonstrates that the standardisation of ideas is accepted by courts as well. These reasons, and 
the adaptation of several protocols and recommendations on combatting (online) hate speech 
by the Council of Europe, who also created the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI), prove that for Europe the marketplace of ideas has a negative rather than a 
positive effect on the regulation and protection of freedom of expression in Europe (Bleich, 
2014; Alkiviadou, 2018; Council of Europe, 2016).  
 
5.4 Delfi: the four criteria  
The emphasis of the ECtHR on the nature of the comments and on the duties and 
responsibilities of Delfi, can be explained by the notion that in Delfi the ECtHR formulated four 
criteria with which it determines whether or not an Internet news portal can be held accountable 
for the comments posted by others and therewith breaches their freedom of expression 
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(European Court of Human Rights Research Division, 2015). The Research Division of the 
European Court of Human Rights (2015) explains that the ECtHR took certain things into 
account when formulating these criteria. These were the nature of the comments, where the 
comments were placed, the owner of the news portal and if there was an economic gain. 
Furthermore, the ECtHR took into account if the measures taken by the applicant company to 
delete the harmful comments as soon as possible after the publication were sufficient. The 
ECtHR also took into account the sanction enforced on the application company (European 
Court of Human Rights Research Division, 2015). Sidlauskiene and Jurkevicius (2017) argue 
that these criteria are not new but are based on the criteria that the ECtHR set out in the cases 
of Axel Springer AG v. Germany (application no. 39954/08) and Von Hannover v. Germany 
(application no. 60641/08) (No. 2) on the assessment of media liability for press releases. 
Furthermore, Sidlauskiene and Jurkevicius (2017) highlight that the criteria used in Delfi were 
also applied in MTE and Index. In this case the ECtHR added two criteria, which include the 
behaviour of the injured party and the consequences of the comments for the injured party 
(Sidlauskiene & Jurkevicius, 2017).  
 
5.5 MTE and Index  
MTE and Index are two companies situated in Hungary. MTE is the self-regulatory body 
of the Internet content providers in Hungary and Index owns one of the largest Hungarian 
Internet news portals (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary 
(application no. 22947/13), 2016). Users were able to comment on items on both portals 
knowing that they were responsible for the comments they posted. MTE published an item on 
its website regarding the ill-practises of two real-estate websites. Index republished the item 
and received comments that were of a rude and despicable nature. The company behind the real 
estate website brought a civil action against MTE and Index and as a response both companies 
removed the comments of their news portals (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyessülete and 
Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (application no. 22947/13), 2016). MTE and Index made 
counterclaims but these were rejected by the Hungarian Supreme Court. MTE and Index 
believed that their right to freedom of expression was violated and they appealed to the ECtHR. 
In this case, the ECtHR concluded that MTE and Index’ right to freedom of expression had 
been violated.  
In MTE and Index, the Court thus ruled that the Hungarian entities could not be held 
liable for the comments posted by others on their website. The ECtHR’s ruling in MTE and 
Index is interesting not only because it is the second case in which it had to analyse if an Internet 
Van Vaals 
29 
 
news portal could be held liable for comments posted by third parties but also because the 
ECtHR came to a different conclusion than in Delfi. Sidlauskiene and Jurkevicius (2017) stress 
that the ECtHR’s case law on liability for Internet news portals asks for a thorough examination. 
The ECtHR used the same criteria in MTE and Index as in Delfi but came to a different 
judgement. Sidlauskiene and Jurkevicius (2017) question whether the criteria should be 
formulated as universal criteria or should be seen as relative and therefore applied ad hoc in 
each case. As seen in the present case, the ECtHR might decide to use the second option, which 
is strengthened by the ECtHR’s preference for an autonomous conception of certain notions.  
 
5.6 The differences between MTE and Index and Delfi 
Based on Delfi, it can be said that Internet news portals have freedom of expression and 
have duties and responsibilities that they should be aware of. The duties and responsibilities of 
Internet news portals extend to third-party contents and therefore differ from the duties and 
responsibilities of traditional media (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09), 2015). In 
addition, Internet news portals can be held liable for third-party comments if the Internet news 
portal provides, for economic purposes, a platform to leave comments and if the comments are 
clearly unlawful expressions, resulting into hate speech and incitement to violence (Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (application no. 22947/13), 
2016). MTE and Index also provide a platform for their uses where they could comment on 
items but as pointed out by the ECtHR the situation in MTE and Index is different than in Delfi. 
The comments posted in the case of MTE and Index, although very rude and offensive, did not 
qualify as clearly unlawful speech that could result into hate speech whereas the comments 
posted on Delfi’s item did.  
According to the remedy of more speech, the offensive comments on MTE and Index’ 
website could be countered with more speech. The risk of having more speech is that this 
particular speech can actually amount to hate speech and therefore adds fuel to the fire instead 
of extinguishing it. In order to prevent a larger fire, the ECtHR prefers to restrict speech if it 
has the tendency to amount to hate speech and incitement to violence and prohibits speech that 
results into clear hate speech. These restrictions create a situation in which the remedy of more 
speech is considered to have a negative effect rather than a positive one on the regulation and 
protection of freedom of expression in Europe. Furthermore, MTE and Index do not have a 
history of publishing degrading comments whereas Delfi’s history of publishing extremely 
offensive and rude comments is notorious (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09), 
2015). Additionally, the ECtHR points out that even though, Index is the owner of the largest 
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Internet news portal in Hungary and therefore, like Delfi, has an economic interest, MTE does 
not have this interest because it is the self-regulatory body of Hungarian Internet content 
providers. In this capacity MTE does not strife for economic gain. For these reasons, MTE and 
Index could not be held liable for user-generated comments by third parties. This could 
potentially have led to a violation of MTE and Index’ right to freedom of expression, which the 
ECtHR found in something else.  
After examining if the interference with the scope of freedom of expression was 
justified, the ECtHR ruled that this was not the case. The ECtHR based its ruling on the fact 
that the domestic courts had not carried out a proper balancing exercise between the real estate 
website’s right to respect its commercial reputation and MTE and Index’s right to freedom of 
expression when deciding if MTE and Index could be held liable for user-generated comments 
of third parties (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary 
(application no. 22947/13), 2016). Furthermore, the ECtHR held that there had been a violation 
of the entities’ freedom of expression because the notice-and-take-down-system of both news 
portals function as an appropriate tool in the majority of the cases for balancing the interests 
and rights of all those concerned. Therefore, the ECtHR finds that this system is able to provide 
adequate protection for the reputation of the real estate websites (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (application no. 22947/13), 2016). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse to what extent the ECtHR treats online hate 
speech as being protected by freedom of expression. Based on the ECtHR’s reasoning in Delfi, 
it can be concluded that the Court treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of 
expression when Internet news portals can be held liable for user-generated comments of third 
parties and that this does not breach the Internet news portal’s freedom to impart information. 
However, as the ECtHR clarifies in MTE and Index, an Internet news portal can only be held 
liable if it is influential and provides, for economic benefits, its users with a platform where 
they can leave comments; and if these comments constitute speech that is clearly unlawful. If 
an Internet news portal does not meet these criteria, it cannot be held accountable for the 
comments posted on their news portals by third parties and therefore, its right under Article 10 
ECHR can be breached. As seen in MTE and Index, the violation of the Internet news portal’s 
right can also be found in a different aspect of the case such as an improper balancing exercise 
of two equal rights. Therefore, it can be concluded that the ECtHR does not treat online hate 
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speech as being protected by freedom of expression when the balancing exercise of two equal 
rights have not been sufficiently executed.  
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Chapter 6 Internet media and online hate speech 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The possibilities that individuals had to exercise their rights to freedom of expression 
and information in the 20th century were limited to printed press, whereas the possibilities for 
individuals to exercise these rights in the 21st century are numerous due to the digitalisation of 
today’s society (Rorive, 2009). Rorive (2009) adds that individuals connected to digital 
networks can reach a large audience globally and can access huge amounts of information 
within seconds. While there is a beauty in gaining easy access to information and entertaining 
an audience worldwide, there is also an ugliness to it. Rorive (2009) argues that new 
technologies such as websites and social media have a significant impact on the spread of online 
hate speech as the Internet offers a global platform to authors of xenophobic and racist 
propaganda and those spreading messages with the intent of causing sincere harm to others. For 
example, the Council of Europe found 4,000 websites spreading xenophobic messages in 2002 
as compared to 160 in 1995 (Rorive, 2009). This example demonstrates that there is a rise in 
websites that publish information that might contain speech that is considered to be clearly 
unlawful and which might amount to hate speech and incitement to violence. Nevertheless, the 
Research Division of the European Court of Human Rights (2015) points out that internet 
publications fall within the scope of Article 10 ECHR. The difficulty of internet publications is 
the medium on which it is published. The Research Division of the European Court of Human 
Rights (2015) stresses that the particular form of the medium in question puts the ECtHR in a 
position where it has to decide on certain limitations that might be enforced on freedom of 
expression on the Internet. Because of the significance of Internet media in cases that involve 
freedom of expression and online hate speech, the aim of this chapter is to examine the role of 
Internet fora to the extent that the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by 
freedom of expression. 
 
6.2 Internet media    
One of the first cases that deals with online hate speech and the rights to freedom of 
expression and information that the ECtHR had to issue a judgement on is Delfi. Delfi turned 
out to be a seminal case because for the first time the ECtHR holds that an Internet news portal 
is liable for the user generated comments of third parties (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 
64569/09), 2015). That Delfi (the Internet news portal) is liable does not violate its freedom to 
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impart information because according to the ECtHR, Delfi had not sufficiently taken the duties 
and responsibilities of its right to freedom of expression into account (Delfi AS v. Estonia 
(application no. 64569/09), 2015). Furthermore, Delfi met the criteria for determining whether 
or not an Internet news portal is accountable for the comments posted by others has not breached 
the portal’s right to freedom of expression (European Court of Human Rights, 2015).  
What has not been given attention by the literature on Delfi and other Internet cases of 
the ECtHR, but is worth analysing, is that the decision reached in Delfi cannot be extended to 
other Internet media. In Delfi, the ECtHR states that this case does not concern other Internet 
media such as a bulletin forum or a social media platform where third parties can post comments 
or engage in online discussions (Delfi AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09), 2015). With 
regards to social media platforms, the ECtHR makes explicitly clear that its decision in Delfi 
does not concern social platforms where the platform provider does not provide any content 
and where the provider may be a private person running the website or blog as a hobby (Delfi 
AS v. Estonia (application no. 64569/09), 2015). The ECtHR’s choice to limit its decision in 
Delfi only to Internet news portals is quite telling given the great range of variety of Internet 
media, the growing presence of social media in everyday life and the increase of hate 
propaganda on the Internet (Breckheimer, 2002). Despite differences in the final judgement, 
the ECtHR seems to uphold its statement in the case of MTE and Index as MTE is a self-
regulatory body of Internet content providers and Index is an Internet news portal (Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyessülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (application no. 22947/13), 
2016). The case of Buda v. Poland (application no. 38940/13) (Buda) might challenge the 
ECtHR’s statement in Delfi and in particular the ECtHR’s statement on social media platforms. 
The Buda case concerns a private person (Buda) who conveyed his private opinion on an online 
discussion forum and who was insulted and threatened by others for expressing his opinion 
(Buda v. Poland (application no. 38940/13), 2015). A social media Internet portal provided the 
online discussion forum. Buda argues that his right to freedom of expression was violated as he 
was not safeguarded from threats and insults uttered by third parties on the online discussion 
forum while expressing his opinion as a private person. The domestic courts ruled that 
individuals who are active on the Internet can be considered public persons and are thus not 
entitled to protection. The domestic courts reasoned that because Buda is active on social media, 
he can be considered a public person and therefore does not deserve protection (Buda v. Poland 
(application no. 38940/13), 2015). Buda appealed to the ECtHR because he did not agree with 
the reasoning of the domestic court. Even though Buda holds that his right to freedom of 
expression is violated, the ECtHR will examine if the social media Internet portal violated 
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Buda’s right to respect for private and family life (i.e. Article 8 ECHR) (Buda v. Poland 
(application no. 38940/13), 2015). Despite the fact that the case of Buda is still pending, the 
ECtHR’s reasoning and final judgement will provide for a very interesting insight in the role of 
social media Internet portals with regards to the right to respect for private and family life and 
the right to freedom of expression. Additionally, the final outcome in the Buda case will also 
determine if the ECtHR will uphold its statement made in the Delfi case or if it will diverge 
from its statement. The latter should not come as a surprise given the ECtHR’s preference for 
autonomous conception of certain notions and its preference for the case-by-case approach so 
that it is not constrained by its own reasoning or case law definitions.  
 
6.3 Speech and Internet media  
At the core of the analysis of the role of Internet media to the extent that the ECtHR 
treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression is speech itself. Kiska 
(2012) points out that where it used to be certain that speech that amounts to hate speech and 
incitement to violence falls outside the scope of freedom of expression and therefore cannot 
justify an interference with the scope of freedom of expression, is not certain anymore. This is 
underlined by the ECtHR’s rulings in the cases of Delfi and MTE and Index. In the first case, 
the ECtHR holds that there had been no violation of Delfi’s freedom of expression for holding 
it liable for user generated comments even though, these comments amount to hate speech and 
incitement to violence. In the second case, the ECtHR holds that there had been a violation of 
MTE and Index’s right to freedom of expression while the comments posted by third parties do 
not amount to hate speech and incitement to violence.  
Based on the judgements of these cases, it can be argued that it is difficult to determine 
for Internet media when the information published or the comments posted is speech that is 
allowed or prohibited under Article 10 ECHR. Susi (2014) stresses that this is amplified by the 
ECtHR omitting in the Delfi case how Internet media can guarantee the protection of third 
parties. It is important for Internet media to know when speech is and is not considered lawful 
speech because in this manner they can protect their audience and themselves from engaging in 
speech that amounts to hate speech and incitement to violence. Even though the ECtHR 
considers the Internet to be a different information and communication tool than the printed 
media, it can be argued that Internet media is media and therefore has the duty to communicate 
information and ideas that matter to the public (Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shetekel 
v. Ukraine (application no. 33014/04), 2011; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom 
(application no. 13585/88), 1991). It can be argued that this duty makes it even more important 
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for Internet media to have clarity on when speech does or not enjoy protection under Article 10 
ECHR because they want to be portrayed by their audience as a medium that informs its 
audience on matters of public interest and not as a medium that is used as a mean to incite hatred 
and violence. Breckheimer (2002) underlines the latter by stating that hate groups portray the 
Internet as unprecedented means of communication to spread messages that incite violence and 
hatred and as unprecedented means of recruiting like-minded people. In other words, hate 
groups view the Internet and its media as a means to an end of which the end is to incite hatred 
and violence instead of as a platform that informs its audience on matters of public interest.  
 
6.4 The marketplace of ideas and the remedy of more speech 
Internet media can be seen as a marketplace of ideas were good and bad ideas are 
expressed and compete for the truth. People will refute good and bad ideas if they belief that 
these ideas do not constitute the truth or people will add more ideas in order to find the truth. 
The marketplace of ideas theory and the remedy of more speech are excellent theories to apply 
to the role of Internet media in cases that deal with freedom of expression and online hate speech 
because, as argued by Breckheimer (2002), the Internet Age has ignited a situation where the 
Internet has rendered national boundaries and guarantees unclear. In other words, it is very hard 
for the governments to interfere and regulate speech online. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
both theories are a negative model for free speech in Europe. This argument is based on the fact 
that in Europe freedom of expression is regulated and is subject to limitations. Kucs (2014) 
argues that even though the ECtHR has granted national authorities a margin of appreciation 
when it comes to the regulation of freedom of expression, the ECtHR has the final say in the 
regulation of freedom of expression. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the role of Internet media to the extent that the 
ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. In this moment 
in time it is difficult to precisely determine what the role of Internet media is in this regard 
because the case law on this subject is limited. The Buda case assumes to be a welcome addition 
to the ECtHR’s case law on cases that deal with freedom of expression and online hate speech 
but this can only be verified once the ECtHR has issued its judgement. Difficult about the role 
of Internet media as well is that it is hard for Internet fora to live up to the image of being a 
respected information and communication tool when it does know when speech is or is not 
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protected by Article 10 ECHR and how it can shield itself and its audience for engaging in 
speech that amounts to hate speech and incitement to violence.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
As stated in chapter 1, the research question of this research is the following: “To what 
extent does the European Court of Human Rights treat online hate speech as being protected by 
freedom of expression?” Before the research question can be answered, this chapter will look 
at how the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom of expression and which approach the 
ECtHR applies when it examines cases that deal with the incitement of hatred and freedom of 
expression. In addition, this chapter will look at the role of liability and Internet media to the 
extent that the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. 
Chapter two reviewed how the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom of expression. 
Based on this chapter, one can conclude that the ECtHR interprets this notion as constituting 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. Furthermore, the ECtHR interprets this 
notion as being applicable to information and ideas that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that shock, disturb or offend the State 
or any other sector of the population. One can conclude as well that the ECtHR does not 
interpret this notion as an absolute right because the right to freedom of expression is subject to 
certain limitations.  
Chapter three described the ECtHR’s approach in dealing with cases that involve hate 
speech and freedom of expression. Based on this chapter, one can conclude that the ECtHR 
uses a case-by-case approach when it is presented with a case that deals with hate speech and 
freedom of expression. Besides the preference for this approach, the ECtHR also favours the 
meaning of an autonomous conception of certain notions. Furthermore, one can conclude that 
if the ECtHR deals with a case that involves Holocaust denial or outright xenophobic or racist 
speech it will be dealt with under Article 17 ECHR. If the ECtHR deals with a case of which it 
is not certain if the speech in question is hate speech, it is dealt with under Article 10 ECHR. 
Concerning the latter, one can conclude too that the ECtHR’s interpretation whether or not the 
speech in question justifies an interference with the scope of freedom of expression is unclear.  
The aim of chapter five was to analyse who is responsible for the user-generated 
comments posted by third parties. Based on the analysis of chapter five, one can conclude that 
Internet news portals have duties and responsibilities that they need to take into account when 
exercising their right to freedom of expression. Additionally, one can conclude that if an 
Internet news portal is large and provides, for economic benefits, a platform for its users where 
they, anonymously or identified, can comment on published items and if these comments 
amount to hate speech and incitement to violence, the Internet news portal in question can be 
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held liable for user-generated comments. This does not impart the Internet news portal’s 
freedom to impart information because the Internet news portal’s duties and responsibilities are 
extended to the behaviour of its audience. One can conclude as well that if an Internet news 
portal does not meet these criteria, it cannot be held accountable for the user-generated 
comments of third parties. Therefore, one can conclude that if an Internet news portal is held 
liable for user-generated comments of third parties and this does not violate the news portal’s 
right to freedom of expression, the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by 
freedom of expression. 
The aim of chapter six was to analyse the role of Internet media to the extent that the 
ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression. Based on the 
analysis of chapter six, one can conclude that in this moment in time it is unclear what the 
precise role of Internet media is to the extent that the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being 
protected by freedom of expression because the ECtHR’s case law on this topic is limited. 
Moreover, one can conclude that the ECtHR’s inconsistent interpretation of when speech is and 
is not protected under Article 10 ECHR poses a challenge for publishing certain articles and 
makes it difficult for Internet media to adequately protect themselves and their audience from 
engaging in speech that amounts to hate speech and incitement to violence.  
Now that it is analysed how the ECtHR interprets the notion of freedom of expression, 
which approach the ECtHR applies when it analyses cases that deal with the incitement of 
hatred and freedom of expression and what the role of liability and Internet media is to the 
extent that the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being protected by freedom of expression, 
the research question of this research can be answered. Based on the examination of the 
previous paragraphs, it can be concluded that the ECtHR treats online hate speech as being 
protected by freedom of expression to the extent that the Internet news portal in question can 
be held liable for user-generated comments without this violating the news portal’s right to 
freedom of expression. The hypothesis of this research is accepted based on the fact that the 
ECtHR issued to two different judgements in comparable cases.  
This research has pointed out that the case law on cases that concern online hate speech 
and freedom of expression is thin. Therefore, further research on this topic, especially with the 
Buda case still pending, is recommended. Further research on the difference between traditional 
and new media and which standards apply is also recommended. The last recommendation of 
this research is to conduct research on Holocaust denial online. It is very interesting to know if 
the ECtHR would render such cases inadmissible or would subject them under the scrutiny of 
Article 10 ECHR.  
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